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A LEGAL OBITUARY FOR RAMIRO
Sheri Lynn Johnson*
Author’s Note
Most death penalty lawyers who practice long enough will watch the execution
of a client. It is always, always terrible, but not always terrible in the same
way. With each client’s execution, a lawyer is confronted with the death of a
human being—not an accidental death, not an inevitable death, but an avoidable
one—and with his or her own failure to prevent that death. Some executions also
involve a very personal loss for the lawyer because of their relationship with the
client. Other executions are horrific because things go awry and impose extreme
suffering on the executed individual. No matter how many times a lawyer walks
that last walk with a client, it does not get easier. Each loss is different because each
life is different. I have lost clients whom I have loved as friends and I have wit-
nessed a botched execution. Ramiro Hernandez Llanas was not a friend, nor did
his execution appear to cause him pain. But for me as a lawyer, his execution was
the hardest. I could not save Ramiro. I could not get even one judge to care about
Texas’s willingness to flout the law. This is the story of Ramiro’s case—not a
famous case, but one that otherwise would be lost to history, as many outrageous
applications of the death penalty are.
INTRODUCTION
In the shuffle of life’s cards, Ramiro Hernandez Llanas got noth-
ing. Really nothing: not a loving family, not adequate food or
shelter, not schooling, not a normal brain, not even a federal court
willing to review the disingenuous justifications offered by the state
of Texas for his execution.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I, “The Making of
Ramiro,” summarizes the violence of Ramiro’s childhood and his
crimes, which are necessary to grasp the abject failure of the rule of
law recounted in Part II, “The Judging of Ramiro.” Part III, “Dies
Irae,” delineates the different failings of the state court, the Fifth
* The James and Mark Flanagan Professor of Law, and Assistant Director of the
Cornell Death Penalty Project, Cornell Law School. I am grateful to my co-counsel, Naomi
Terr, both for her wonderful work on this case and for her unfailing compassion for Ramiro.
I am also grateful to former students Alison Bain-Lucey, Laura Berumen, and Patrick Wilson
for the work they did on this case long after their duties in the clinic had ended.
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Circuit, and the Supreme Court, and reflects on the reforms that
might address those failings. Part IV, “Requiescant in Pace?” offers a
concluding thought.
I. THE MAKING OF RAMIRO
A. Ramiro’s Childhood
The facts of Ramiro’s childhood are so stark that editorializing is
not necessary. Moreover, the state never disputed the extraordinary
poverty, constant exposure to neurotoxins, and violent abuse at the
hands of his parents that characterized Ramiro’s developmental pe-
riod as a child.
1. Extreme Deprivation
Ramiro was born to a family of ten children in Nuevo Laredo,
Mexico in 1969.1 When he was two or three years old, his family
moved to a toxic waste dump.2 When they arrived, they had no shel-
ter and slept on the ground outdoors.3
The family built a ramshackle hut from cardboard, metal, and
wood gathered from the dump, but it was so insecure that Ramiro’s
father had to tie it down in the wind so that it would not blow away.4
The hut had a dirt floor and rodents freely entered.5 Like the rest
of the makeshift shelters at the dump, the hut had neither water
nor electricity.6
Ramiro’s family survived by scavenging through the trash at the
dump.7 Ramiro’s parents forced him to work at the dump when he
was about four years old.8 A neighbor, who also scavenged through
the trash, described the grueling nature of the work:
1. Cf. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Hernandez v. Stephens, 134 S.Ct. 1760 (2014)
(No. 13–8004) (denying writ of certiorari to 537 F. App’x. 531 (5th Cir. 2013)) [hereinafter
Petition for Writ of Certiorari].
2. See Hearing Pursuant to Writ Vol. 3 of 6 at 14, Texas v. Hernandez, 2008 Tex. Crim.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 599 (Tex. Crim. App. Sep. 10, 2008) [hereinafter Hearing Vol. 3].
3. Hearing Pursuant to Writ Volume 4 of 6 at 298, Texas v. Hernandez, 2008 Tex.
Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 599 (Tex. Crim. App. Sep. 10, 2008) [hereinafter Hearing Vol. 4].
4. Hearing Vol. 3, supra note 2, at 15.
5. Id. at 17.
6. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 1.
7. Hearing Vol. 3, supra note 2, at 18.
8. Id.
WINTER 2017] A Legal Obituary for Ramiro 293
Working in the dumps was very hard . . . . You would end up
black, black from the dust . . . We worked without gloves . . .
[or any] protection . . . . Our noses would get full of dirt.
[W]e worked out in the open air . . . . We worked in the four
winds [and] the very hot sun. If it was drizzling, we still had to
take out the garbage. . . . Sometimes we even had to work at
night.
Sometimes there would even be dead animals among the trash.9
The family ate from the trash.10 Another neighbor recalled that
when her family had leftover food, her mother sent that food to
Ramiro’s house because his family was so much poorer than the
other dump residents.11
2. Exposure to Neurotoxins
The dump that Ramiro’s family called home exposed him and
his family to a variety of unidentified toxic chemicals and spray con-
tainers.12 The chemicals included black dust from a company that
built brakes for cars—a dust that “burned when you breathed or
would even burn your eyes.”13 Several times during Ramiro’s child-
hood the chemicals ignited.14 Ramiro’s brother recalled one
chemical fire that blew up the holding tanks and spread for
blocks.15
The family’s drinking water exposed Ramiro to additional toxins.
His family stored the water in containers formerly used by gas sta-
tions—they used trash to clean off the oily residue.16 As a young
child, Ramiro would climb inside the containers in an attempt to
clean them. According to his sister, Yolanda, he would come out
“all black, coal black, and you could only see his eyes.17
9. Petitioner-Appellant’s Motion to Expand the Certificate of Appealability and Brief in
Support at 13, Hernandez v. Stephens, 537 F. App’x. 531 (5th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-70006)
[hereinafter Motion to Expand].
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Hearing Vol. 3, supra note 2, at 13–14.
13. Id.
14. See id. at 20.
15. Id. at 20–21.
16. Hearing Vol. 4, supra note 3, at 303.
17. Id.
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3. Severe Physical Abuse
Severe physical abuse was ubiquitous throughout Ramiro’s child-
hood. His father “disciplined” him with “belts, wires, hoses,
whatever was available.”18 His sister Adelita explained:
My father at work had some kind of stake, the one that he used
there to hit the horses . . .  And when we didn’t obey him,
that’s the wood he would hit us with. He would also hit us with
electricity cables, with wires, with a belt, with a broom, or with
whatever he could find.19
His mother was even more violent. One sibling reported that she
“would kick [Ramiro], and she would hit him with electric wires,
the ones that go over the posts. She even once broke a broomstick
in his back.”20 Another sibling recalled that Ramiro received the
most abuse:
[S]ince [Ramiro] was the one who understood the least, he
was the one who got beaten the most . . . . [W]hen my mother
would come looking for [him, he would] hide among the
cardboard boxes that were laying there. . . . [S]he would start
hitting with these bars all the boxes. So whenever she found
[Ramiro], she would leave him laying on the floor almost
passed out because of the beating he would get. It was always
like that.21
Neighbors also confirmed the severe abuse. One stated that
“[s]ometimes she would hit him with a belt, sometimes with a rope,
sometimes with a piece of cable . . . with whatever she could find,”22
so when Ramiro came to the neighbor’s house to hide, the neigh-
bor would lie to his mother and say she had not seen him so he
could avoid being beaten by her.23 Another neighbor also recalled
the severe abuse Ramiro and his siblings endured at the hands of
their parents:
I was scared of [their] mother . . . She dealt with her children
by yelling and hitting. She would say very harsh curse words to
18. Hearing Vol. 3, supra note 2, at 24.
19. Hearing Vol. 4, supra note 3, at 261.
20. Id. at 238.
21. Id. at 302.
22. Motion to Expand, supra note 9, at 15.
23. Id.
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them. Since our house was very close to [their] house, we
could hear when she would beat her children. It sounded as
though she was hitting them with a whip and you could hear
the screams of the children.24
B. Ramiro’s Crimes
Half of a capital trial is mitigation. The other half is aggravation,
and given Ramiro’s background, it is not surprising that the state
was able to offer substantial evidence in aggravation. Ramiro was
quite violent on several occasions before the capital offense of
which he was convicted. On at least one occasion, he and his broth-
ers beat his sister.25 In 1989, at the age of twenty, he was convicted
of manslaughter in Mexico, a conviction elevated, on appeal, to
murder.26 In what seemed like the first break in his entire life, the
prison hospital guard fell asleep, and Ramiro simply walked out.27
Assisted by others, he crossed the border into Texas soon after.28
But it was not a fresh start. After entering the United States,
Ramiro raped a fifteen-year-old girl at knifepoint.29
In 1997, Ramiro had obtained minimal employment caring for
puppies at a ranch outside Kerrville, Texas.30 According to the
rancher’s wife, one night in October, her husband went outside to
speak with Ramiro.31 Ramiro returned to the house with blood on
his hands and face, then held a knife to her neck and sexually as-
saulted her twice.32 After he tied her hands and feet, he stole her
jewelry, then went outside to start the rancher’s Jeep,33 returned to
the house, tied the rancher’s wife more securely, left and returned
again, and sexually assaulted her again.34 After threatening to harm
the woman’s mother and daughter if she called the police, Ramiro
fell asleep next to her.35 While Ramiro slept, the woman freed her-
self, escaped to a neighbor’s house, and called 911.36 Police officers
24. Id.
25. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 5.
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 4.
30. Id. at 35.
31. Id. at 4.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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woke and arrested Ramiro.37 The police then found the rancher’s
body;38 he had been bludgeoned to death with a crowbar.39
Ramiro was charged with capital murder for this crime. In the
penalty phase of his capital trial, the prosecution introduced his
Mexican conviction, his prison behavior, and testimony relating to
two uncharged prior offenses: the rape of a fifteen-year-old girl, and
the knifing of a man at a bar.40
C. The Judging of Ramiro
Different people might judge Ramiro’s moral agency and moral
desert differently. Indeed, the Constitution requires that twelve ju-
rors assess a defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty,41 each of
whom applies his or her own moral compass (albeit within the
bounds of the law), but the functioning of the legal system that
condemned and executed Ramiro may also be judged, and that
judging is not so free-form. At the very least, legal proceedings that
culminate in execution are judged with respect to a constitutional
floor.
1. The Constitutional Framework
a. Individualized Decision-Making
One can imagine—and in the past, some jurisdictions have en-
acted—a capital-sentencing scheme that renders all the facts about
Ramiro’s past irrelevant and determines his guilt based solely upon
his crimes, but such a scheme is impermissible today. The meaning
of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment is not static; it compels consideration of “the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety.”42 For the last forty years, one aspect of those evolving standards
“has been the rejection of the common law practice of inexorably
imposing a death sentence upon every person convicted of a speci-
fied offense.”43 Any process that “accords no significance to relevant
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 4–5.
41. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
42. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
43. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976).
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facets of the character and record of the individual offender or the
circumstances of the particular offense”44 is impermissible because
it “excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment
of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stem-
ming from the diverse frailties of humankind.”45
Similarly, statutes that make imposition of the death penalty
mandatory fail Eighth Amendment scrutiny because they treat all
persons convicted of murder “not as uniquely individual human be-
ings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be
subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death,”46 but pro-
hibition against the “blind infliction” of the death penalty goes
beyond the condemnation of mandatory capital sentencing re-
gimes; it requires that the sentencing body possesses “the fullest
information possible concerning the defendant’s life and character-
istics.”47 The state may not preclude consideration of “the diverse
frailties of humankind,”48 but what ensures that the jury will actually
be provided with “the fullest information possible concerning the
defendant’s life and characteristics”?49
b. The Effective Assistance of Counsel.
A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance
of counsel is violated whenever counsel provides professionally defi-
cient representation that results in prejudice.50 It took the Supreme
Court almost thirty years to explain how this right applied to the
presentation of individualized mitigation evidence in capital cases,51
but it is now clear that, in the context of a capital sentencing pro-
ceeding, counsel’s performance is deficient whenever he breaches
his duty “to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s
background.”52 Although “strategic choices made after thorough in-
vestigation . . . are virtually unchallengeable[,] strategic choices
made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely
to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the
44. Id. at 304.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 603 (1978) (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241, 247 (1949)).
48. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
49. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 602–03.
50. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984).
51. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
52. Williams, 529 U.S. at 396.
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limitations on investigation.”53 Prejudice flowing from deficient in-
vestigation or presentation of mitigating evidence is established
when the available mitigating evidence that is not presented “might
well have influenced the jury’s appraisal of [the defendant’s] moral
culpability.”54
c. Categorical Ineligibility
Even when a jury has made a determination based on full knowl-
edge of individual frailties, that jury might simply incorrectly
balance aggravating and mitigating factors. If a jury’s decision is
wrong in an idiosyncratic way, then the defendant must rely upon
proportionality review or clemency to save him. Both are very small
safeguards; proportionality review has no teeth in any state, and
clemency in many states is virtually never granted.55 To protect
against more systematic errors, however, another shield is in place.
Because “[c]apital punishment must be limited to those offenders
who commit a narrow category of the most serious crimes and
whose extreme culpability makes them the most deserving of execu-
tion,”56 the Court has considered whether there are categories of
offenders whose diminished moral culpability renders them ineligi-
ble for the death penalty.
One such category is relevant to Ramiro: intellectual disability. In
Atkins v. Virginia,57 the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amend-
ment categorically bars the imposition of the death penalty on
persons with intellectual disability.58 First, the Court determined
that there was a national consensus against the execution of per-
sons with intellectual disability.59 Then, applying its own judgment,
it concluded that sound reasons reinforced that consensus: because
intellectual disability diminishes a defendant’s culpability, it under-
mines both retributive and deterrent justifications for the death
penalty, and raises a “special risk of wrongful execution.”60 To sup-
port a categorical exemption, the Court relied on two professional
53. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91).
54. Williams, 529 U.S. at 398.
55. See generally, J. Acker & C. Lanier, May God—or the Governor—Have Mercy: Executive
Clemency and Executions in Modern Death-Penalty Systems, 36 CRIM. L. BULL. 200 (2000).
56. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) (citing Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
58. In Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014), the Supreme Court switched to the nomen-
clature now used by mental health professionals, “intellectual disability.”
59. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
60. Id. at 317–21.
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definitions of intellectual disability.61 Both definitions have three
prongs: (1) significantly sub-average intellectual functioning; (2)
limitations in adaptive functioning; and (3) onset before age 18.62
2. Judging Ramiro’s Judges
Capital proceedings are long—at least nine steps even if there
are no reversals. Each case begins with a trial, followed by a direct
appeal, followed by a petition for certiorari after the direct appeal.
Then, state post-conviction proceedings examine the trial: what
counsel failed to present, what the prosecution withheld, how the
jurors misbehaved, whether any new legal developments have oc-
curred since trial. State post-conviction proceedings are also
followed by an appeal and a petition for certiorari. After state post-
conviction proceedings, there is the federal habeas corpus proceed-
ing in district court. The district court examines all of the state
court proceedings for error, followed by an appeal to a federal cir-
cuit court, and a final cert petition.
Measuring Ramiro’s proceedings against the three relevant con-
stitutional standards—individualized decision-making, effective
assistance of counsel, and categorical ineligibility—yields shortfalls
at each stage.
a. Trial
Shortly after Ramiro’s arrest in late 1997, one of his “friends,”
Carmen, visited him in jail after consulting her husband’s attor-
ney.63 While there, she convinced Ramiro to admit to a stabbing
with which her husband was charged64 and to which Ramiro had no
evidentiary ties.65 Three days after the state dropped the charges
against Carmen’s husband, the lawyer who had represented him—
and who had engineered Ramiro’s confession—was appointed lead
counsel to defend Ramiro in his capital murder case.66
61. Id. at 308 n.3.
62. Id.
63. Motion to Expand, supra note 9, at 44.
64. Id.
65. The state never produced any evidence (other than the admission Carmen elicited
from Ramiro) that Ramiro had any connection with the stabbing. As discussed below, there
was ample evidence linking Carmen’s husband to the stabbing.
66. Motion to Expand, supra note 9, at 45.
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Perhaps out of loyalty to his first client, Ramiro’s trial counsel
presented none of the abundant evidence that Carmen’s hus-
band—and not Ramiro—committed that crime.
Because the lawyer had previously represented Carmen’s hus-
band, he would have had access to this evidence: police reports that
showed two eyewitness identifications of Carmen’s husband as the
perpetrator,67 strong circumstantial evidence placing the husband
at the scene,68 and a police officer’s assessment that the husband’s
denials were not credible.69 There was no evidence at all implicat-
ing Ramiro as the assailant or even as having been at the scene of
the crime.
Moreover, Ramiro’s lawyers conducted family and social history
“investigations” so minimal that not even a hint of the childhood
trauma that Ramiro endured was revealed.70 Indeed, they con-
ducted such a limited investigation that it suggests they did not
know what a mitigation investigation is.71 Counsel sent a former po-
liceman to Mexico to ask Ramiro’s mother to come to the United
States to plead for his life.72 Not surprising, Ramiro’s mother, his
most persistent and savage abuser, refused.73 The officer, as in-
structed, spoke to no one else in Mexico.74 He did speak to
Ramiro’s sister in Texas, who was the same sister that Ramiro and
his brothers beat while pregnant,75 and who also refused to help.76
Counsel did not conduct any further social history investigation
prior to trial.77
As a result, the jury heard penalty phase evidence establishing
future dangerousness, but no persuasive evidence in mitigation.
Two defense psychiatrists, neither informed by a family and social
history, offered differing psychiatric diagnoses.78 A psychologist, Dr.
Martinez, reported Ramiro’s low IQ scores of fifty-four and fifty-
67. Id. at 43.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 4.
71. Id. (stating that based on an interview with one sister, lead counsel “did not feel that
it was necessary or even potentially in [Petitioner’s best interest] to dwell on interviews with
her or additional family members”).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 5.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 5. During jury selection, counsel sent a letter to another sister in Mexico asking
for helpful information, but did not explain what would be helpful; counsel also phoned the
sister mid-trial to say, without explanation, that his mother needed to come to the United
States immediately, but, again not surprisingly, she did not come.
78. Id.
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seven,79 but because Ramiro’s lawyers had not supplied information
about Ramiro’s childhood or adaptive functioning, Dr. Martinez
could not determine whether Ramiro had an intellectual
disability.80
No one testified to the abhorrent conditions of Ramiro’s up-
bringing, including his family’s extreme poverty, his constant
exposure to neurotoxins, the violent beatings both parents regu-
larly inflicted upon him, or the fact that he grew up on a waste
dump, eating from it and sorting trash and begging at the age of
four.
It could be argued that the only malfeasance at this stage was that
of Ramiro’s trial lawyers, but the judge appointed Ramiro’s trial
counsel, and he knew—or should have remembered—that trial
counsel had represented Carmen’s husband. Perhaps that was only
negligence, and perhaps he cannot be blamed for the completely
inadequate mitigation investigation that trial counsel conducted. In
any event, the trial judge’s performance is the pinnacle of judging
compared to what followed.
b. State Post-Conviction Proceedings
State post-conviction proceedings raised a number of claims, but
two stood out: Ramiro’s jury never heard the evidence of his ex-
traordinarily deprived and abusive childhood, and he was ineligible
for execution because of his low intelligence.81 The state courts’
treatment of both claims sharply departed from relevant constitu-
tional commands.
After the jury had sentenced Ramiro to death in 200082 and the
Texas Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction,83 the Supreme
Court decided Atkins.84 Ramiro’s state post-conviction counsel
sought a hearing on an Atkins claim and ineffective assistance of
counsel. In support of these claims, they proffered affidavits from
Ramiro’s family members, describing the extreme conditions of his
childhood summarized in Part I. They also proffered several IQ test
results well within the intellectually disabled range, and affidavits
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 5.
82. Brief for Appellant 2, Hernandez v. Stephens, 537 F. App’x. 531 (5th Cir. 2013) (No.
12-70006).
83. Id.
84. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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describing Ramiro’s functioning as a child and as a young adult.85
Despite these proffers, the lower state court refused to grant an evi-
dentiary hearing on either claim, and denied relief on all claims.86
For the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the lower state court,
with little elaboration, deemed counsel’s minimal efforts adequate.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of relief
on the ineffective assistance claim, but remanded the case to the
lower court for a hearing on the Atkins claim.87
Both expert and lay evidence provided compelling support for
the Atkins claim. Prior to the hearing, Dr. Antonio Puente, who had
conducted between 2500 and 5000 intellectual disability examina-
tions for the Social Security Administration, and who was the
Project Director for the Spanish translation of the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale (WAIS), evaluated Ramiro.88
Puente administered twenty different neuropsychological tests to
Ramiro, including several IQ tests.89 On all these tests, a score of
seventy or below indicates that the subject is within the intellectu-
ally disabled range; on each test, Ramiro scored seventy or below.90
On the Comprehensive Test of Non-Verbal Intelligence, Ramiro
scored fifty-two; on the Beta III, he scored sixty-four; and on the full
scale Spanish WAIS, he scored sixty-two using American norms.91
Even using Mexican norms, which are widely criticized for overstat-
ing IQ,92 Ramiro’s IQ score was seventy.93 Dr. Puente also reviewed
the results of Dr. Martinez’s prior testing, which included an IQ
score of fifty-four on the WAIS III performance subtest and an IQ
score of fifty-seven on the Test of Nonverbal Intelligence II.94 Citing
multiple sources—including results of tests that screen for malin-
gering consistency between academic achievement tests and family
members’ reports regarding Ramiro’s functioning, clinical impres-
sions, and his own experience administering thousands of IQ
tests—Dr. Puente concluded that Ramiro was not malingering.95
85. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 5.
86. Id. at 6.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Hoi K. Suen & Stephen Greenspan, Linguistic Sensitivity Does Not Require One
to Use Grossly Deficient Norms: Why U.S. Norms Should Be Used with the Mexican WAIS-III in Capital
Cases, 34 PSYCHOL. INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 2, 2 (2008); Hoi K. Suen & Ste-
phen Greenspan, Serious Problems with the Mexican Norms for the WAIS-III When Assessing Mental
Retardation in Capital Cases, 16 APPLIED NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 214, 215 (2009).
93. See Hearing Vol. 4, supra note 3, at 151.
94. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 6.
95. Id. at 6–7.
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Thus, the expert evidence was highly credible due to the qualifica-
tions of the experts, and that evidence was unequivocal.
Lay witnesses—three siblings and a neighbor—added further evi-
dence of intellectual disability. They testified to Ramiro’s extreme
deficits in conceptual, practical, and social skills, which manifested
during childhood, including his inability to sort glass, pile card-
board, do homework, bathe himself, run simple errands, prepare
food safely, travel alone, make change, play games, or follow direc-
tions.96 Because of his inability to learn, his school kicked him out
in the third grade.97 His peers both cheated him out of money and
made fun of him because of his limitations.98 Based on this undis-
puted testimony, and his clinical evaluation and testing of Ramiro,
Dr. Puente concluded that Ramiro has an intellectual disability.99
The only expert testimony the state offered in response was from
Dr. Coons, a psychiatrist who was patently unqualified to diagnose
intellectual disability: Dr. Coons had never administered or even
scored an IQ test, nor could state the clinical definition of intellec-
tual disability.100 Moreover, he was particularly unqualified to offer
an opinion about Ramiro because he had never spoken to Ramiro
or interviewed a single person who had observed Ramiro’s function-
ing.101 Additionally, because he could not speak Spanish, Dr. Coons
could not read the protocols from the IQ tests Dr. Puente had ad-
ministered.102 Yet these obstacles did not stop Dr. Coons from
stating that Ramiro might be malingering to avoid the death pen-
alty,103 though he did admit that malingering or lack of motivation,
if present, were “not extremely important factors.”104 Thus, the only
expert who doubted that Ramiro met the first diagnostic criterion
for intellectual disability was both unqualified and uncertain.
Regarding the second diagnostic criterion for intellectual disabil-
ity, Dr. Coons was more certain, though equally unqualified to
express an opinion. He discounted all evidence of adaptive func-
tioning deficits as normal for Ramiro’s “cultural group.”105 During
96. Id. at 7.
97. Id. at 3.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 7.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. Dr. Coons testified that a psychologist with whom he consulted thought that
some of the protocols might have been incorrectly scored, but admitted that the psycholo-
gist’s review was limited because that psychologist, like Dr. Coons, was unable to understand
Spanish.
103. Id.
104. Id., at 7–8.
105. Id. at 8 n.4. Prior to the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Coons provided an affidavit that
relied on Ramiro’s “cultural group” as a basis for determining that Ramiro does not meet the
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his testimony, Dr. Coons repeatedly referred to Ramiro’s “cultural
group” as explaining his poor functioning.106 However, Dr. Coons
admitted that he had no prior knowledge of that group: “Well, his
cultural group is—we’ve heard lots of testimony about it. I don’t
know that I could—you can just scrape all those things together. I
don’t know much about it beyond that.”107 Moreover, Dr. Coons’s
generalizations about Ramiro’s “cultural group” did not address the
far higher functioning of Ramiro’s siblings, who presumably be-
longed to the same cultural group.108
Following the hearing, the State submitted a proposed order
concluding that Ramiro met none of the criteria for intellectual dis-
ability, which the lower state court signed with some
modifications.109 With respect to intellectual functioning, the state
court order rejected all of Ramiro’s IQ scores in the fifties and low
sixties as the product of malingering, finding more reliable a single
score of eighty-three on a prison-administered rough screening in-
strument.110 This screening test, however, was an invalid instrument
for multiple reasons: it was extremely short, was designed only to
classify prisoners for services rather than diagnosis, was very out-
dated, and was administered by unqualified prison personnel
through an interpreter.111 Finally, the accuracy of the score—for
whatever little value it might have had—could not be checked be-
cause the raw data was destroyed.112 The order discussed neither
the multiple sources of invalidity of the prison-administered test
nor Dr. Puente’s reasons for rejecting the possibility of malingering
on the valid tests.113
As noted in the certiorari petition, “with respect to adaptive func-
tioning, the state court order cited Dr. Coons’s testimony that,
given Ramiro’s ‘cultural group,’ his ‘skills in communication, self-
care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health
and safety, functional academics, leisure and work, were appropri-
ate and [ ] did not support a finding of [intellectual disability].’”114
criteria of intellectual disability. Id. Post-conviction counsel moved to strike the affidavit on
Equal Protection grounds. Id. Following the evidentiary hearing, post-conviction counsel re-
newed the motion to strike Dr. Coons’s affidavit and moved to strike his testimony based
both upon Dr. Coons’s lack of qualifications and the violation of Ramiro’s equal protection
rights. Id. Both motions were denied. Id.
106. Id. at 8.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 8–9.
114. Id. at 9.
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However, the order did not discuss the testimony that his siblings—
members of the same cultural group—shared none of his defi-
cits.115 The order also cited Ramiro’s employment, but did not
acknowledge that his jobs all involved unskilled labor and menial
tasks.116 It further cited his criminal activity and attempt to deceive
his interrogators, but did not note that his attempt to deceive law
enforcement was quickly and predictably unmasked.117 Similarly,
the order cited his escape from custody in Mexico, without men-
tioning that the record established that he was able to simply walk
away while the guard slept.118 It also cited his illegal border cross-
ing, but without considering testimony from a state witness that he
received assistance.119 Finally, it listed his “coherent, articulate and
knowledgeable” confessions and ability to “mak[e] written, mean-
ingful requests,” but failed to acknowledge either the incoherent
and tangential “answers” he gave during his interrogation or the
extremely simple content of his error-ridden writings.120 Most re-
markably, as further evidence purportedly inconsistent with
adaptive functioning limitations, the order cited that Ramiro drank
beer, drove a car, behaved normally in court, communicated with
counsel, and could distinguish right from wrong.121
Finally, with respect to the third criterion, juvenile onset, the or-
der stated only that there was no “credible evidence that any
[intellectual disability] manifested during the developmental
period.”122
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the lower court’s
decision without opinion.123 Thus, at the end of state court pro-
ceedings, the lower state court had dismissed the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim as meritless despite the fact that the jury
knew nothing of the extreme poverty of Ramiro’s childhood, his
constant exposure to neurotoxins, or the violent beatings both par-
ents regularly inflicted upon him, and the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals had affirmed that determination without comment. The
lower court had also denied Ramiro’s Atkins claim based upon rea-
soning wildly deviant from clinical understandings of intellectual
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Ex Parte Hernandez, 2008 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 599, at *1 (Tex. Crim.
App. Sep. 10, 2008).
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disability, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals likewise af-
firmed that determination without comment.
3. Federal District Court Proceedings
On federal habeas, Ramiro argued that the state court determi-
nation of both his Atkins claim and his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim relied upon “unreasonable determinations of fact”
and that the application of law to the facts were “contrary to, and
involved an unreasonable application of,” clearly established Su-
preme Court precedent.124 He also argued that, because he was
denied an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance claim in
state court, he was entitled to one in federal court.125
The federal district court denied the motion for a hearing and
denied relief on all claims.126 The district court’s treatment of the
intellectual disability claim is remarkable in its factual misstate-
ments regarding state court credibility determinations. Its opinion
regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is equally re-
markable, but remarkable for its dramatic departures from
Supreme Court precedent. The district court’s opinion demon-
strates how far it was willing to go to sustain a death sentence.
a. Intellectual Disability
As set forth below, the district court’s initial order denying Atkins
relief attributed credibility determinations to the state court that
the state court had never made; the district court also mischaracter-
ized, both through omission and misstatement, much of the critical
evidence. In the absence of these gross factual errors, the district
court’s conclusion is untenable. The section below recounts four of
those false assertions.
According to the district court, “[t]here are several reasons why
the state habeas trial court reasonably gave more credence to Dr.
Coons’s opinions regarding Petitioner’s lack of adaptive function-
ing deficits over the opinions of Dr. Puente.”127 Although the
district court’s order denying Ramiro’s Rule 59 motion withdrew
that sentence, the court inserted as a replacement an identical sen-
tence except for the replacement of the word “credence” with the
124. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 10.
125. Id.
126. See Hernandez v. Thaler, 2011 WL 4437091 at *59 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2011).
127. Id. at *23.
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word “weight”: “[T]he state habeas trial court reasonably gave more
weight to Dr. Coons’s opinions regarding Petitioner’s lack of adap-
tive functioning deficits over the opinions of Dr. Puente . . . .”128 Yet
call it weight or call it credence, the state court made no such com-
parison of credibility. In fact, at four separate points in its proposed
order, the state specifically asked the state court to disparage Dr.
Puente’s credibility, and at all four points, the court crossed out the
language doing so, eliminating that finding from the order it
signed.129
Second, according to the district court:
Petitioner failed to present the state habeas trial court with any
credible testimony from independent third parties with per-
sonal knowledge of [Appellant]’s developmental milestones or
any documentation from reliable independent sources ad-
dressing Petitioner’s achievement or failure to achieve
developmental childhood milestones . . . [and consequently]
the state habeas trial court reasonably found the testimony of
Petitioner’s siblings and neighbor regarding [his] childhood
to be incredible.130
The order further asserted that “[t]he state habeas trial court rea-
sonably relied upon the information contained in the November
2002 statement of [Ramiro’s sister] when it rejected Ramiro’s Atkins
claim.”131 It then stated that, in contrast to the sister’s 2002 affidavit,
the testimony of Ramiro’s siblings and a neighbor during the state
court evidentiary hearing “are so extreme as to defy credibility.”132
128. Hernandez v. Thaler, 2012 WL 394597 at *29 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2012) (emphasis
added).
129. See generally Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Post-Convic-
tion Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Ex Parte Hernandez, 2008 Tex. Crim. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 599 (Tex. Crim. App. Sep. 10, 2008) [hereinafter Supplemental Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law on Post-Conviction Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus].
The court crossed out and initialed a paragraph that criticized Dr. Puente’s methodology,
and concluded “This court did not find Dr. Puente to be credible”; crossing out and initial-
ing the sentence “The court finds that Dr. Puente’s opinion regarding the applicant’s
malingering to lack credibility”; crossing out and initialing the statement, “In summary, this
Court finds Dr. Coons’ opinion to be more credible and trustworthy than those of Dr. Puente
and Dr. Martinez”; crossing out and initialing the sentence “Dr. Puente improperly applied
the law in his analysis by considering adaptive behavior only prior to 18 years of age to the
exclusion of current behavior, thus making his opinion unreliable.” Moreover, it is easy to see
why the district court did not give more weight to Coons’s testimony than to Puente’s; there
were many reasons to find Dr. Coons completely unqualified, and none to find him more
credible than the preeminently qualified Dr. Puente.
130. Hernandez, 2011 WL 4437091 at *23.
131. Id. at *20 n.153.
132. Id.
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But these assertions about the state court credibility findings are
simply wrong. On the contrary, the state habeas trial court specifi-
cally rejected the State’s proposed findings crediting Ramiro’s
sister’s 2002 statement and determining that the testimony of his
relatives was not credible, again by crossing out those proposed
findings.133
Third, the district claimed that “Given the . . . diagnosis of Peti-
tioner as possessing an anti-social personality . . . the trial court
reasonably credited Dr. Coon’s concern over the likelihood that
negative motivation may have caused Petitioner’s test scores to inac-
curately under-measure [his] true level of intellectual
functioning.”134 However, the state court never relied on an antiso-
cial personality disorder diagnosis in any of its findings. Indeed,
there is absolutely no discussion of antisocial personality disorder in
the state court’s decision.
Finally, the district court’s opinion stated that “[G]iven Peti-
tioner’s high scores on a number of the tests administered by Dr.
Puente, the state habeas trial court reasonably rejected the conten-
tions of Dr. Martinez and Dr. Puente that Petitioner was too
‘unsophisticated’ to have ‘malingered by deliberately performing
poorly on some IQ tests.’”135
Although Ramiro’s experts testified that he was too unsophistica-
ted to malinger in a fashion that would be undetectable to experts,
the state court never rejected these contentions, or even addressed
them. Moreover, the state court could not have “reasonably” done
so based on Petitioner’s high scores because he had no valid high
scores.
These four false assertions of state court findings do not stem
from false assertions in the state’s brief, but originated with the dis-
trict court. The blatant inaccuracy of those statements is confirmed
by the fact that the State never repeated them in later proceedings.
133. The State had proposed the following language:
The court finds that the testimony of the above relatives of the applicant is not entirely
credible as the demeanor exhibited indicates an attempt to assist the applicant’s posi-
tion, with the exception of Adelita who described the basis for her testimony being an
attempt to heal a breach with the family over this issue. Each of these witnesses was
interviewed prior to hearing by defense expert, Dr. Antonio Puente.
See Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Post-Conviction Application
for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 129, at 12. But rather than endorsing that proposed
finding, the state court crossed out the entire paragraph and initialed that he struck it out.
Id.
134. Hernandez, 2011 WL 4437091 at *22.
135. Id.
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Despite the state court’s express rejection of the proposed find-
ing that the state’s expert was more credible than the defense
experts, the district court insisted that logic compelled the conclu-
sion that the state court implicitly made that finding.136 The district
court likewise asserted that, despite the state court’s express rejec-
tion of the finding that the neighbor’s and family members’
testimonies on Ramiro’s childhood limitations were not credible,
that finding was made implicitly as well.137
b. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The district court took a different, but no less idiosyncratic, ap-
proach to the ineffective assistance claim. The district court did not
try to defend the order on its own terms probably because that or-
der seemed, on its face, to fly in the face of circuit precedent
concerning what constituted an adequate investigation.138 Instead,
the district court argued that the state court opinion was not con-
trary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court
precedent because reasons exist that could have rendered the deci-
sion to find counsel’s conduct competent reasonable if the state
136. Id. at *88.
137. Id. at *101. If the state court had not expressly rejected those credibility determina-
tions, it might not be crazy to imply them. Here, however, the state court expressly rejected
the credibility determination the district court claims it “must” have made, given its legal
conclusions. But “[i]n a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus
by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual
issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Thus,
its factual determinations—not its legal conclusions—must be presumed to be correct. More-
over, there is an obvious reconciliation of the state’s factual findings and its legal conclusions
that does not require ignoring either one. The state court found both the defense lay testi-
mony and its expert testimony credible—but applied the wrong legal standard to that
testimony. If the state court held extreme stereotypes of intellectual disability (as suggested
by its citation of facts, such as Appellant’s drinking beer, as disproving intellectual disability),
then it would have found a lack of “credible evidence that any intellectual disability mani-
fested during the developmental period.” Hernandez, 2011 WL 4437091 at *108. The state
court applied the wrong legal standard—the equivalent of a “drooling idiot” standard that
fails to protect mildly mentally retarded offenders as Atkins requires.
138. The “investigation” of Ramiro’s family and social history was limited to brief conver-
sations with three family members. However, the Fifth Circuit had previously declared that
“three uncooperative family members does not an unwilling family make,” Adams v. Quarter-
man, 324 F. App’x. 340, 348 (5th Cir. 2009), and noted that “[i]t is widely accepted that
family members do not represent the only potential avenue of mitigating evidence,” Id. at
347.
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court had articulated them.139 It is unclear if this substituted justifi-
cation is permissible under AEDPA.140 Even if hypothetical
reasoning can supplant actual, clearly impermissible reasoning,
however, the hypothetical reasoning offered by the federal district
court was no cure. The district court’s concoction was a soup of
legally irrelevant and absurd statements, beginning with a com-
plaint about the purported failure of Ramiro’s family members to
offer mitigating information to counsel:
None of [the affidavits from Ramiro’s family] include any as-
sertions that any members of Ramiro’s family ever
139. The state court made no findings at all on the prejudice, but the district court also
supplied reasons for concluding that counsel’s omissions did not prejudice Ramiro. See Her-
nandez, 2011 WL 4437091 at *135. Those reasons also contravene Supreme Court precedent,
and, probably for that reason, were not endorsed by the Fifth Circuit. First, the district court
relied upon Ramiro’s brutal crime and significant criminal history—which included a rape, a
knifing, and a murder conviction in Mexico—as precluding a finding of prejudice. Id. at
*137. That reasoning, however, flies in the face of the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams,
which found prejudice for failure to conduct an adequate family and social history investiga-
tion despite the defendant’s history of savagely beating an elderly woman, stealing two cars,
setting fire to a home, stabbing a man during a robbery, and confessing to choking two
inmates and breaking a fellow prisoner’s jaw. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 362 (2000)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). It also is contrary to the Supreme Court’s statement that it has
“firmly established that sentencing juries must be able to give meaningful consideration and
effect to all mitigating evidence that might provide a basis for refusing to impose the death
penalty on a particular individual, notwithstanding the severity of his crime or his potential to
commit similar offenses in the future.” Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 246 (2007).
Equally contrary to Supreme Court precedent, the district court reasoned that “the lack of
any evidence of genuine remorse or sincere contrition” led it to “conclude[ ] de novo there
is no reasonable probability that, but for the failure . . . to present evidence of [Ramiro]’s
abused and deprived childhood, the outcome of the punishment phase would have been
different.” Hernandez, 2011 WL 4437091 at *138. Of course, Ramiro’s life history—his very
limited cognitive ability, his elementary school education, the great brutality and numbing
poverty he experienced as a child—would have helped to explain the absence of apparent
remorse to the jury. But more importantly, the Supreme Court, over the dissent’s objection,
found that the defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to conduct an adequate mitiga-
tion investigation, despite the absence of “regret or remorse for his heinous crimes.” Sears v.
Upton, 130 S.Ct. 3259, 3271 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
140. Whether a federal court may hypothesize “reasonable” reasons as a substitute for the
state court’s unreasonable ones has not been determined by the Supreme Court. It has held
that “[w]here a state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas peti-
tioner’s burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court
to deny relief.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011) (emphasis added). The Fifth
Circuit has held that even when the state court decision does provide an explanation for its
conclusion, that explanation, if unreasonable, may be ignored and the decision nonetheless
upheld if a federal court can imagine a reasonable basis for the decision. Neal v. Puckett, 286
F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (stating that upon federal habeas review of a state
court’s adjudication, a federal court ultimately “review[s] only a state court’s ‘decision,’ and
not the written opinion explaining that decision”); see also Santellan v. Cockrell, 271 F.3d 190,
193 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The statute compels federal courts to review for reasonableness the
state court’s ultimate decision, not every jot of its reasoning.”).
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communicated the gist of [the conditions of his childhood] to
[Ramiro]’s investigator or trial counsel.141
This statement, while true on its face, misses the fact that none of
Ramiro’s relatives were asked questions about those conditions. In-
deed, the investigator spoke to three relatives, but by the
investigator’s own account, he did not ask anyone about Ramiro’s
childhood.142 It was counsel’s duty to investigate—not the duty of
Ramiro’s relatives, who had no knowledge of what was legally rele-
vant, to come forward.
The district court again completely ignores counsel’s duty to inves-
tigate when it digresses to completely unfounded speculation about
what Ramiro might have told mental health professionals who ex-
amined him:
While complaining about the alleged failure of [Ramiro]’s de-
fense team to contact members of [Ramiro]’s family, [the
claim] . . . ignores the fact [Ramiro] was interviewed by no less
than three different mental health clinicians [who testified at
trial and whom Ramiro furnished] with a personal history . . .
Thus, there was evidence in the record from which the state
habeas court reasonably could have determined [Ramiro]’s
trial counsel [was] aware of the dire circumstances of
[Ramiro]’s childhood, even without personally interviewing
every member of [Ramiro]’s family. [Ramiro] does not allege
. . . he concealed [those facts from the experts].143
The state court did not articulate its assumption that Ramiro
himself told the mental health experts about the neurotoxins to
which he was exposed, the third-world poverty that he survived, or
the abuse that he endured. Moreover, there is nothing in the re-
cord to suggest that Ramiro—a man with a third grade education—
did, or even could have, described these conditions. Mental health
experts are supposed to be furnished with a social history to assist
their diagnosis, but they are not substitutes for a family and social
history investigation. This is, in part, because the defendant may be
unaware of what happened when he was very young, he may be too
ashamed to reveal it, too cognitively limited to report it, or com-
pletely unaware of the legal significance of mitigating facts. It is
likely that all of these factors would have impaired Ramiro as a
141. Hernandez, 2011 WL 4437091 at *123.
142. Motion to Expand, supra note 9, at 8–9.
143. Hernandez, 2011 WL 4437091 at *124–25.
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source. Indeed, it is impossible to square this aspect of the district
court’s rationale with the Supreme Court’s insistence on a thor-
ough family and social history.
The district court also denigrated the importance of Ramiro’s
horrible childhood by a statement that borders on tautology:
Whatever sympathy that evidence showing [that Ramiro] was
an abused, neglected child might have engendered in
[Ramiro]’s capital jury, the reality was, at the time of
[Ramiro]’s capital murder trial, [that] Ramiro was no longer a
child.144
Of course, all capital defendants are adults at the time of trial,145
and if their adulthood justified failure to investigate or present a
family and social history, then counsel could never be found inef-
fective based upon their failure to conduct a family and social
history investigation.146 This conclusion also cannot be squared with
Supreme Court precedent requiring such investigations and with
finding counsel ineffective for failing to conduct them.
However, the district court’s following statement is the most re-
markable, both for its misstatement of the law and for its
breathtaking callousness:
There is also the obviously double-edged nature of such evi-
dence. Ramiro’s jury might very well have interpreted
testimony showing Ramiro’s abusive, deprived childhood as es-
tablishing that Ramiro was destined from an early age to grow
into a violent adult . . . . The picture of [Ramiro]’s childhood
painted [by state post-conviction proceedings and confirmed by new
evidence] is so utterly bleak and bereft of hope it would likely have
furnished a shrewd prosecutor with compelling evidence from which to
argue [Ramiro] was molded by his own family into a person without a
conscience who posed a substantial risk of future violence.147
144. Id. at *132.
145. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding juveniles ineligible for the
death penalty).
146. Indeed, even when the defendant is fifty-four at the time of the crime, it is “unrea-
sonable to discount to irrelevance the evidence of [his] abusive childhood.” Porter v.
McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 43 (2009). Moreover, Williams, Wiggins, Rompilla v. Beard (545 U.S.
374 (2005)), and Sears v. Upton (130 S.Ct. 3259 (2010)) provide four additional examples of
cases where, despite the fact that the defendant “was no longer a child,” the Supreme Court
found counsel ineffective based upon failure to investigate and present evidence of child-
hood abuse, neglect, and hardship.
147. Hernandez, 2011 WL 4437091 at *34 (emphasis added).
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Thus, according to the district court, the fact that Ramiro’s child-
hood was truly horrendous—“utterly bleak and bereft of hope”148—
was why trial counsel should not have investigated it and should not
have presented the results of its investigation to the jury. This state-
ment flies in the face of virtually every ineffective assistance of
counsel case decided by the Supreme Court.149 It also imagines a
jury—all twelve jurors—so heartless and cynical that compassion
could not touch them. Moreover, it suggests that a jury is willing to
disobey the instruction that, after future dangerousness is estab-
lished, it must consider whether mitigating factors warrant a
sentence of life imprisonment.150 Finally, the district court ignores
the fact that counsel never made a strategic decision not to present
mitigating evidence of Ramiro’s childhood—because counsel failed
to perform the requisite investigation.151
4. The Fifth Circuit Proceedings.
Just as the federal district court abjured reliance on the reason-
ing of state court, the Fifth Circuit chose not to endorse the
reasoning of the federal district court. Instead, it invented new justi-
fications for the state court‘s conclusions regarding intellectual
disability and ineffective assistance.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000) (“Whether or not those omis-
sions were sufficiently prejudicial to have affected the outcome of sentencing, they clearly
demonstrate that trial counsel did not fulfill their obligation to conduct a thorough investiga-
tion of the defendant’s background.”); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522–23 (2003) (“In
light of these standards, our principal concern in deciding whether [counsel] exercised “rea-
sonable professional judgment . . . is not whether counsel should have presented a mitigation
case[, but] . . . whether the investigation supporting counsel’s decision not to introduce
mitigating evidence of Wiggins’ background was itself reasonable.”); Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 377
(“We hold that even when a capital defendant’s family members and the defendant himself
have suggested that no mitigating evidence is available, his lawyer is bound to make reasona-
ble efforts to obtain and review material that counsel knows the prosecution will probably
rely on as evidence of aggravation at the sentencing phase of trial.”); and Sears, 130 S.Ct. at
953 (“[T]hat a theory might be reasonable, in the abstract, does not obviate the need to
analyze whether counsel’s failure to conduct an adequate mitigation investigation before ar-
riving at this particular theory prejudiced [the defendant].”).
150. See Ex parte Gonzales, 204 S.W. 3d 391, 394 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“We have
adapted the Supreme Court’s prejudice test to require a showing that there is a reasonable
probability that, absent the errors, the jury would have answered the mitigation issue
differently.”).
151. Although “strategic choices made after thorough investigation . . . are virtually un-
challengeable,” “strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable
precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on
investigation.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690–91 (1984); see also Wiggins, 539
U.S. at 521 (quoting Strickland); Soffar v. Dretke, 368 F.3d 441, 487 (5th Cir. 2004) (same);
Lewis v. Dretke, 355 F.3d 364, 367 (5th Cir. 2003).
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a. Intellectual Disability.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that habeas
relief was not available.152 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) limits the power of
federal courts to grant the writ of habeas corpus to cases in which
the state court decision was “contrary to or involved an unreasona-
ble application” of Supreme Court precedent or “based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts.”153 According to the Fifth
Circuit, the state court’s decision was neither. Citing § 2254(e)(1),
the Fifth Circuit added that Ramiro did not rebut the presumption
of correctness “by clear and convincing evidence.”154 Largely ignor-
ing the district court’s reasoning, the Fifth Circuit substituted new
hypothetical justifications for the state court’s decision, explained
below.
With respect to intellectual functioning, the Fifth Circuit held
that “other evidence” undermined the accuracy of IQ scores in the
intellectual-disability range.155 The “other evidence” cited by the
court included “[e]vidence . . . that [Ramiro’s] motivation to score
lower could have been a factor in the test results.”156 The Fifth Cir-
cuit’s opinion acknowledges neither Dr. Puente’s multiple reasons
for rejecting that possibility nor Dr. Coons’s admission that, if such
motivation affected the score, it had very little effect.
Additional “other evidence” the Fifth Circuit cited to undermine
the scores was a completely novel objection to Ramiro’s evidence:
“When scaled to Mexican norms, [Ramiro] scored exactly [seventy]
on the one full-scale WAIS-III test.”157 In raising this criticism, the
court did not acknowledge that: 1) Ramiro scored sixty-two on this
test using American norms; 2) Mexican norms have been criticized
as overstating IQ; or 3) Ramiro could not have produced more than
152. See Hernandez v. Stephens, 537 F. App’x. 531, 533 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134
S. Ct. 1760 (2014).
153. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1)–(2).
154. Hernandez v. Stephens, 537 F. App’x. at 540. The Fifth Circuit did not adopt the
district court’s approach of relying upon adverse credibility determinations crossed out by
the state court, but instead introduced a new source of credibility determinations not briefed
by the parties: statements made by the state district court in the order written prior to the
remand for an evidentiary hearing—i.e., determinations made prior to hearing the testimony
of any witnesses. Id. The opinion defends this new source by noting that the order issued
after the hearing states that it incorporates the order issued prior to the remand; it does not
address the possibility that the incorporation statement refers to the findings made with re-
spect to Ramiro’s other claims, nor does it consider whether explicit rejection of credibility
determinations after testimony was heard trumps earlier determinations made prior to the
taking of testimony.
155. Id. at 539.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 531.
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one full-scale score to prove sub-average intellectual functioning be-
cause no other appropriate full scale IQ test is available in Spanish,
the only language he speaks.158
In the course of reviewing the state court evidence on adaptive
functioning, the Fifth Circuit cited the opinions of Dr. Coons as
supporting the state court’s conclusion that Ramiro’s did not have
significant deficits, but it did not mention Dr. Coons’s opinions
were based upon his view that Ramiro’s poor functioning was due
to his “cultural group.”159 It also failed to acknowledge that that the
state court findings incorporated reliance upon Ramiro’s “cultural
group,”160 or to question whether such reliance was impermissible
racial stereotyping, as the defense argued.
b. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
The Fifth Circuit found the state court’s determination that
Ramiro failed to establish the incompetence of his trial counsel’s
performance was reasonable.161 Its justification for doing so, how-
ever, was completely unsupported by the record. Recounting the
“investigation” conducted by trial counsel, the Fifth Circuit asserted
that the three professionals (two psychiatrists and one psychologist)
interviewed Ramiro and “learned about his history, including his
abusive and deprived childhood,” all three of whom “testified at
trial and presented evidence of their evaluations to the jury.”162
However, the state court articulated no such finding, and there is
no evidence in the record that any of the three learned anything at
all about Ramiro’s “abusive and deprived childhood” from
Ramiro.163
The Fifth Circuit also cited “[e]vidence . . . that counsel em-
ployed someone to travel to Mexico and interview [Ramiro’s]
mother and two siblings[,] each of whom provided written declara-
tions. The interviews revealed detailed information about [his]
violent childhood circumstances and behavioral abnormalities.”164
This is indisputably wrong: the only written declarations signed by
the siblings in Mexico were obtained by post-conviction counsel, not
158. See supra notes 96–102.
159. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 7.
160. Id.
161. The Fifth Circuit denied the motion to expand the Certificate of Appealability to
include the ineffective assistance claim, but nonetheless addressed the merits of the claim.
Hernandez v. Stephens, 537 F. App’x at 540–41.
162. Id. at 541.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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by trial counsel.165 There is no evidence in the record that trial coun-
sel had information from anyone concerning either the violence
Ramiro endured as a child or his “behavioral abnormalities.” More-
over, these “facts” are the Fifth Circuit’s own invention. They were
never asserted by the State or the state court.
3. Certiorari.
After the Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of the habeas corpus
petition, but before Ramiro’s petition for certiorari had to be filed,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hall v. Florida.166 The peti-
tion in Hall challenged Florida’s imposition of a bright line cut-off
at an IQ of seventy for the determination of Atkins’s first prong.167
The petition argued that this cut-off violated professional norms
concerning the assessment of sub-average intellectual functioning
and consequently violated Atkins.168 The issue Hall would determine
was closely related to the first question raised in Ramiro’s petition:
Whether a federal court may find a state court determination that a
defendant is not a person with an intellectual disability neither
“contrary to, [nor] involv[ing] an unreasonable application of” At-
kins, based upon reasons that are inconsistent with clinical
definitions of intellectual functioning and adaptive functioning.
Because Ramiro’s case involved a deviation from professional
norms with respect to the first prong (albeit a different deviation
than Hall raised), it would not have been surprising if the Court
had chosen to hold Ramiro’s petition until Hall was decided. Alter-
natively, because the case involved deviations from professional
norms on the second prong, the Court might have granted certio-
rari to determine whether deviations on the second prong, like
deviations on the first prong, violated Atkins.
The petition for certiorari filed on behalf of Ramiro presented
two additional questions:
1. Whether a state court determination that denies a Mexi-
can national the protection of Atkins v. Virginia based upon his
165. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 4.
166. Hall v. Florida, 134 S.Ct. 1986 (2015) (holding that Florida’s rule foreclosing further
exploration of a capital defendant’s intellectual disability if his IQ score was more than 70
created unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability would be executed, in viola-
tion of Eighth Amendment).
167. Id. at 1992.
168. Id. at 2000.
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national origin and native language is “contrary to, or in-
volv[es] an unreasonable application of” this Court’s
precedents[.]
2. Whether, with respect to either an Atkins claim or a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, the reasonableness of a
state court’s factual determination under § 2254(d)(2) or the
correctness of such a determination under § 2254(e)(1) may
be assessed without consideration of the evidence proffered by
the petitioner[.]169
Four different amici filed supporting briefs. The American Asso-
ciation on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, the premier
organization of intellectual disabilities professionals, and the Arc,
an advocacy organization for persons with intellectual disabilities,
argued that to ensure non-arbitrary applications, Atkins claims must
be assessed under generally accepted clinical definitions.170 The
AAIDD brief also demonstrated that the application of the intellec-
tual functioning prong in this case embodied a fundamental
misunderstanding of the objective, standardized measures used to
assess significantly sub-average intellectual functioning.171 AAIDD
explained that the interpretation of Ramiro’s adaptive behavior ig-
nored relevant data, particularly from the developmental period,
and hinged instead upon professionally unacceptable
stereotyping.172
The Brief of Amicus Curiae for the United Mexican States in
Support of Petitioner argued that Dr. Coons’s testimony reflected
personal prejudices and false stereotypes regarding Mexican cul-
ture.173 It maintained that both the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and international law precluded reliance
on culture.174
The Amici Curiae Brief of League of United Latin American Citi-
zens, American Gateways, Texas Appleseed, and Latino Law
Professors in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari argued that
169. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at i.
170. See generally Brief for American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disa-
bilities as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Hernandez v. Stephens, 537 F. App’x. 531
(2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1760 (2014).
171. Id. at 7–8.
172. Id. at 8–13.
173. See Brief for The United Mexican States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Her-
nandez v. Stephens, 537 F. App’x. 531 (2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1760 (2014) (No. 13-
8004), 2014 WL 316661 at 13–17.
174. Id. at 12.
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the conclusion that Ramiro was not intellectually disabled imper-
missibly depended upon his ethnicity.175  It attacked both the
intellectual-functioning and the adaptive-functioning determina-
tions as race discrimination, and linked that discrimination to the
dismal history of discrimination against Latinos in Texas.176
Finally, a group of conservative legal academics filed the Brief of
Public Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner.177
Their brief first noted the signatories’ lack of commitment to the
correctness of Atkins, and then protested the influence of race in
determining intellectual disability. The brief also collected and dis-
cussed many other Atkins cases in which race has played a role.178
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court denied certiorari with no dis-
sent from its denial in October 2013.179 Texas executed Ramiro on
April 9, 2014.
On May 27, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Hall,
holding unconstitutional Florida’s rule that an IQ score of more
than seventy foreclosed further exploration into capital defendant’s
intellectual disability.180 The Court reasoned that this rule disre-
garded both medical practice and a consensus in other states, and
thereby created an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual
disability would be executed, in violation of Eighth Amendment.181
III. DIES IRAE (“DAY OF WRATH”)
Parts I and II recounted, in some detail, a story of Article III
judges completely mischaracterizing the facts, omitting relevant
facts, and asserting facts with no support in the record. This story
also involves Texan recalcitrance, Fifth Circuit race discrimination,
and Supreme Court passivity. Because this is a journal of reform
and not despair, suggestions follow below on how the manifest in-
justice in this case might be avoided in the future.
175. See Brief for League of United Latin American Citizens et al. as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Petitioner, Hernandez v. Stephens, 537 F. App’x. 531 (2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
1760 (2014) (No. 13-8004), 2014 WL 316660 at 6, 24 [hereinafter Brief for League of United
Latin Am. Citizens et al.].
176. Id. at 8–11.
177. See Brief for Public Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Hernandez
v. Stephens, 537 F. App’x. 531 (2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1760 (2014) (No. 13-8004), 2014
WL 333536 [hereinafter Brief for Public Law Scholars].
178. Id.
179. See Hernandez v. Stephens, 537 F. App’x. 531 (2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1760
(2014).
180. Hall v. Florida, 134 S Ct. 1986, 2001 (2014).
181. Id. at 1995, 1998.
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A. Not Dumb Enough for Texas?
The state post-conviction judge’s order contained strikingly and
indisputably incorrect statements about intellectual disability.182
Most notably, the order credits a screening test, invalid for many
reasons, over multiple scores on valid tests.183 It relies in large part
on the “expert” opinion of someone patently unqualified as an ex-
pert and employs blanket racial stereotypes regarding the adaptive
functioning of Latinos.184 Finally, it cites behaviors completely
within the abilities of a person with intellectual disability, such as
“drinking beer,” as proof that Ramiro was not a person with intel-
lectual disability.185
The state proposed the order ultimately adopted by the state
post-conviction court judge, a practice that is frequently disap-
proved of as compromising judicial independence, or at least the
appearance of independence, but not so serious as to require
reversal.186
In this case, however, the judge clearly read the order and edited
out extreme credibility determinations the state proposed in its
draft. While this was a step in the right direction for judicial inde-
pendence, it led to a muddled, illogical final order. The judge
removed the state’s proposed language that disparaged Dr. Puente
and the lay witnesses, but the court failed to affirmatively find these
witnesses credible. If one does not disparage the credibility of Dr.
182. See supra Part I.C.2 for discussion of state-post conviction proceedings.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. The only exception of which I am aware is the extreme and embarrassing situation
presented in an Alabama post-conviction case:
Noting that the circuit judge who ruled on Ingram’s Rule 32 petition was not the
judge who had presided over Ingram’s trial, the Supreme Court determined that the
circuit court’s wholesale adoption of the State’s proposed order constituted reversible
error because the order contained patently erroneous statements, including state-
ments that the circuit judge ruling on the petition had presided over Ingram’s trial,
which he had not; that the circuit judge had personally observed the performance of
Ingram’s trial counsel, which he had not; and that the circuit judge was basing his
decision, in part, on events within his own personal knowledge of the trial of the case,
of which he had no knowledge. Recognizing the general rule “that, where a trial court
does in fact adopt [a] proposed order as its own, deference is owed to that order in
the same measure as any other order of the trial court,” the Supreme Court found
that the “unusual” circumstances of the case rendered the general rule inapplicable
. . . The Supreme Court then held that “the nature of the errors present in the June 8
order . . . undermines any confidence that the trial court’s findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law are the product of the trial judge’s independent judgment and that the
June 8 order reflects the findings and conclusions of that judge.”
Ingram v. Alabama, 103 So. 3d 86, 88–89 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012) (citations omitted).
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Puente or the law witnesses, it is impossible to understand how the
evidence failed to establish intellectual disability under governing
professional definitions. The unreasonableness of the order is
made plain by the fact that neither the federal district court nor the
Fifth Circuit defended the state court’s reasoning. One might sim-
ply respond that better training is needed for lower court state
judges.
Perhaps this would help. However, if the lower state court’s er-
rors are viewed as the product of (fixable) ignorance or
idiosyncrasy, the failure of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to
write an opinion correcting these errors is less easily dismissed.
That court sees many Atkins cases, and indeed, that court has reso-
lutely charted its Atkins enforcement, or rather, its under-
enforcement, path contrary to professional consensus. In any other
jurisdiction, Ramiro would have been found to be a person with
intellectual disability. He just wasn’t dumb enough for Texas, which
has its own standard for the determination of Atkins ineligibility for
capital punishment.187
Because one of the most basic principles of intellectual disability
is that its strengths coexist with its weaknesses, according dispositive
weight to a defendant’s strengths clearly strays from clinical defini-
tions. However, Texas courts completely disregarded this in their
judicial revision of the Atkins-approved clinical definitions. In Ex
Parte Briseno, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals articulated (and
since has followed) “evidentiary factors which fact-finders in the
criminal trial context might also focus upon in weighing evidence
as indicative of [intellectual disability] or a personality disorder.”188
The seven Briseno factors189 have no connection, either historical or
187. See infra notes 210–216 and accompanying text.
188. Ex Parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
189. Id. at 8–9. Briseno sets forth these factors:
• Did those who knew the person best during the developmental stage—his family,
friends, teachers, employers, authorities—think he was mentally retarded at that
time, and, if so, act in accordance with that determination?
• Has the person formulated plans and carried them through or is his conduct
impulsive?
• Does his conduct show leadership or does it show that he is led around by others?
• Is his conduct in response to external stimuli rational and appropriate, regardless of
whether it is socially acceptable?
• Does he respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or written questions or
do his responses wander from subject to subject?
• Can the person hide facts or lie effectively in his own or others’ interests?
• Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the capital offense, did
the commission of that offense require forethought, planning, and complex execu-
tion of purpose?
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logical, to clinical definitions.190 Instead, several factors incorporate
stereotypes by asking whether the defendant acts rationally and re-
sponds coherently, whether he can lie, and whether he can plan—
all of which a person with intellectual disability is generally able to
do.191 Another factor Briseno instructs courts to rely upon is whether
people who knew the defendant as a child thought that he was
mentally retarded; this reliance upon lay opinion, however, is pro-
hibited by professional consensus.192 Finally, the factors narrow the
scope of relevant adaptive functioning behaviors from a wide uni-
verse of possibilities to a group of seven questions,193 and
completely ignore some of the skill areas set out in the clinical defi-
nitions, such as home living and self-care.194
Perhaps Texas’s deviance from the consensus of intellectual disa-
bility professional consensus should not be surprising given its
history of flouting the Supreme Court’s rulings regarding the signif-
icance of intellectual disability.195 Even before Atkins rendered
persons with intellectual disabilities categorically ineligible for exe-
cution, Texas was engaged in a struggle with the Court over the
mitigating significance of intellectual disability. In Penry v. Lynaugh,
the Supreme Court reversed Penry’s capital sentence because Texas
refused to instruct Penry’s jury that it could consider and give effect
to mitigating evidence concerning his intellectual disability and his-
tory of abuse by declining to impose the death penalty.196 After
Penry, Texas courts were still recalcitrant in implementing Supreme
Court rulings on intellectual disability; the jury instructions at
Penry’s resentencing did not comply with the Supreme Court’s
mandate in Penry I, and required a second grant of certiorari and
reversal.197
Obviously, neither Texas nor any other state should be free to
decide how much intellectual impairment is enough to exempt a
defendant from execution: it is axiomatic that a constitutional pro-
vision—the Eighth Amendment—must mean the same thing in all
190. For the premier manual on clinical definitions and best practices, see generally ROB-
ERT L. SCHALOCK ET AL., AM. ASS’N INTELLECTUAL AND DEV. DISABILITIES, INTELLECTUAL
DISABILITY: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS (11th ed.) (2010).
191. See generally, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (4th ed. rev. 2000) (stating that intellectual disability does not preclude indepen-
dent living, friends, jobs, or spouses).
192. SCHALOCK ET AL., supra note 190, at 85.
193. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8–9.
194. SCHALOCK ET AL., supra note 190, at 44.
195. See infra notes 218–220 and accompanying text.
196. 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989).
197. Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001). The Fifth Circuit has its own history of coop-
erating with Texan recalcitrance regarding the significance of intellectual disability. See e.g.,
Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004).
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states. Nonetheless, the success rates for Atkins claims vary enor-
mously by, and correspond to, differences in substantive
definitions.198 In Hall v. Florida, the Supreme Court took the first
step to enforce a uniform definition of the first prong, sub-average
intellectual functioning.199 Texas’s Briseno factor approach to the
second prong, adaptive functioning, represents at least as large a
deviation from professional norms as did Florida’s approach to in-
tellectual functioning, and because Texas contributes such a large
proportion of this country’s death sentences,200 its approach to the
second prong threatens uniform application of the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibition much more than did Florida’s strict IQ cut-off.
More broadly, less systematic deviations from professional defini-
tions on the second prong are rampant, both in Texas and in other
states201 For example, from 2008 to 2012, all of the reported losses
discussed some aspect of the claimant’s prison behavior as support
for the court’s conclusion that the claimant failed to demonstrate
deficits in adaptive functioning sufficient to satisfy the second
prong.202 However, as at least one court has noted,203 the clinical
literature is adamant that consideration of behavior in institutional
settings is inappropriate because how an individual functions in
highly structured environments (such as death row) says very little
about how well he can cope with the demands of ordinary life.
198. John Blume et al., A Tale of Two (and Possibly Three) Atkins: Intellectual Disability And
Capital Punishment Twelve Years After The Supreme Court’s Creation Of A Categorical Bar, 23 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 393, 413–14 (2014) [hereinafter Blume et al., Tale of Two Atkins]:
24 cases have been litigated in Florida, and through 2013, the claimant lost in every
single one of those cases. The success rates in Alabama (5 out of 34), Georgia (1 out of
9), Kentucky (1 out of 9), Tennessee (0 out of 8), Texas (8 out of 45), and Virginia (0
out of 7) are also strikingly low. In contrast, the North and South Carolina rates (28
out of 34 and 5 out 6, respectively) are strikingly high. Our additional data not only
confirms the jurisdictional variation we saw in the earlier cases, but also aligns with
procedural and substantive differences in the state system. Rates are lower in states
with substantive deviations from clinical definitions. Florida and Alabama are in that
category, as both of them (prior to Hall) adhered to an IQ cutoff. Texas also deviates
greatly, having adopted its own idiosyncratic approach to adaptive functioning. And
Georgia, too, is an oddity, as it requires proof of intellectual disability beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.
199. Hall v. Florida, 134 S Ct. 1986, 2001 (2014) (holding that the “Court agree[d] with
the medical experts that when a defendant’s IQ test score falls within the test’s acknowledged
and inherent margin of error, the defendant must be able to present additional evidence of
intellectual disability, including testimony regarding adaptive deficits”).
200. Blume et al., Tale of Two Atkins, supra note 198, at 413 (noting that by 2014 Texas
had decided 45 Atkins cases).
201. Id. at 414.
202. Id. at 406.
203. United States v. Smith, 790 F. Supp. 2d 482, 517 (E.D. La. 2011); United States v.
Hardy, 762 F. Supp. 2d 849, 899 (E.D. La. 2010).
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The problem is not that the professional consensus is unclear.
The problem is enforcement. The most obvious enforcer is the Su-
preme Court, and as discussed below, the need for Supreme Court
policing in this—or some other—Texas Atkins case is at least as
pressing as was the need for Supreme Court review in Hall. How-
ever, because Supreme Court review of every Atkins case with a
rogue expert will never occur, discipline of such experts is also
important.
The American Psychiatric Association has been willing to disci-
pline psychiatrists whose testimony in death penalty cases has
violated professional norms. Most notably, the APA expelled Dr.
Grigson, colloquially referred to as “Dr. Death.”204 He was expelled
after he violated the APA’s ethics code by “arriving at a psychiatric
diagnosis without first having examined the individuals in question,
and for indicating, while testifying in court as an expert witness,
that he could predict with 100[%] certainty that the individuals
would engage in future violent acts.”205
Psychologists—not psychiatrists—provide most of the expert tes-
timony in Atkins cases. No organization that licenses psychologists
has been willing to discipline a psychologist for testimony that con-
travenes professional consensus. However, if the professional
organizations from both disciplines were willing to police members
who testify in defiance of professional norms, the most extreme de-
viations might be avoided.
B. Not White Enough for the Fifth Circuit?
We count on the federal courts to enforce constitutional rights,
including those guaranteed by the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause, through the writ of habeas corpus.206 After AEDPA, a fed-
eral court’s role as protector is less vigorous because its power to
grant relief is limited to cases where the state courts have made
unreasonable determinations of fact or where the decision is “con-
trary to, or an unreasonable application of . . . federal law” as
determined by the Supreme Court.207 Nonetheless, their job is to
police recalcitrant state courts, not to offer new defenses for their
errors. Certainly distorting the record to affirm state court decisions
204. Chris McDaniel, Texas Court Halts Execution of Man Who Didn’t Kill Anyone, BUZZFEED
(Aug. 19, 2016) https://www.buzzfeed.com/chrismcdaniel/jeff-wood-texas-execution?utm_
term=.fmqPJLaK#.dxqdAExb.
205. Id.
206. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
207. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012).
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is not the role that the framers of the Constitution—or even the
drafters of AEDPA—had in mind.
We also rely on the federal courts to protect racial minorities by
enforcing the provisions of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.208 Yet both the federal district court and
the Fifth Circuit were silent concerning the racial implications of
Dr. Coons’s testimony. Without addressing the stereotyping that Dr.
Coons employed to discredit the evidence of impaired adaptive
functioning, both the district court and the Fifth Circuit deter-
mined that a state court decision relying on his opinion would be
reasonable. However, Dr. Coons’s opinion both employed a deroga-
tory ethnic stereotype—that it was normal for persons in Ramiro’s
“cultural group” to be unable to cook food, count change, travel
alone, perform simple jobs, read and write competently—and also
used that stereotype to find that Ramiro was not impaired in his
adaptive functioning. Therefore, the court reasoned, Ramiro was
not intellectually disabled. Thus, the state court’s reasoning allowed
Texas to execute Ramiro based on stereotypes of his “cultural
group” when it would not have been able to execute a white person
displaying the same behavior.
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit went beyond passive, silent incorpo-
ration of the state court’s discrimination on prong two. It created
its own discriminatory justification for the state court’s conclusion
that Ramiro did not meet the prong one requirement of substan-
dard intellectual function. According to the Fifth Circuit, despite
Ramiro’s multiple valid IQ scores in the sixties (all administered in
Spanish), and no valid score above seventy, the state court decided
that the lack of more than one full-scale IQ score using Mexican
norms meant he had not met the burden of proving substandard
intellectual functioning. This reasoning, however, precludes every
Mexican national from Atkins relief, because there is only one Mexi-
can-normed IQ test. To permit the execution of Mexicans (and
only Mexicans) because they have failed to produce results on tests
that do not exist is also blatant racial discrimination.
Is it surprising that any reform at all is necessary to eradicate ex-
plicit209 racial discrimination in the imposition of the death
penalty? For half a century, racial classifications have been sub-
jected to strict scrutiny, which requires that the law’s use of a racial
208. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
209. As I have argued elsewhere, discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty is
rampant. See e.g., John Blume et al., Post-McCleksey Racial Discrimination in Capital Cases, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1771, 1774–76 (1998). However, it is rarely explicit.
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classification to be necessary to the accomplishment of a compel-
ling state interest.210 Even when racial classifications are “benign” or
intended to compensate for past discrimination, it is now clear that
strict scrutiny applies.211 In this case, racial classifications were used
against a member of a historically disadvantaged group in order to
permit that person’s execution. For what compelling state interest
could these explicit uses of race against a member of a disadvan-
taged group be necessary? Again, an established norm was violated,
and again, the obvious enforcer should have been the Supreme
Court.
C. Not Important Enough for the Supreme Court?
Rule 10 of the Supreme Court Rules sets forth the considerations
governing review on writs of certiorari, and each of the three listed
reasons for granting the writ requires “an important federal ques-
tion.”212 Moreover, the rule cautions: “[a] petition for a writ of
certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of erro-
neous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated
rule of law.”213
At one time, individual injustice troubled the Supreme Court
enough that it was willing to grant certiorari to engage in “error
correction” on behalf of death-sentenced inmates.214 Those days are
gone.215
210. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
211. Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989).
212. SUP. CT. R. 10.
213. Id.
214. See generally, Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections on the Role of Appellate Courts: A View from the
Supreme Court, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 91 (2006); see also, EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME
COURT PRACTICE 276 (9th ed. 2007) (“It has been reiterated many times that the Supreme
Court is not primarily concerned with the correction of errors in lower court decisions.”).
215. Indeed, the pendulum has swung the other way. As another commentator noted,
“the current Court’s disdain for error correction is selective. In a steady trickle of cases, the
Court has been granting certiorari and summarily reversing decisions favorable to criminal
defendants and habeas petitioners.” Robert Yablon, Justice Sotomayor and the Supreme Court’s
Certiorari Process, 123 YALE L.J. FORUM 551, 562 n.49 (2014) (emphasis added).
During the 2012 Term, for instance, the Court granted certiorari and summarily reversed
without argument in five cases. Three of these decisions wiped out rulings in favor of prison-
ers seeking habeas corpus. See Ryan v. Schad, 133 S. Ct. 2548 (2013); Nevada v. Jackson, 133
S. Ct. 1990 (2013); Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446 (2013). None of them granted relief
to a criminal defendant or prisoner. Likewise, six of the Court’s eleven summary reversals
during the 2011 Term nullified rulings in favor of habeas petitioners and a seventh went
against a family that sought damages for alleged police misconduct. See Parker v. Matthews,
132 S. Ct. 2148 (2012); Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060 (2012); Wetzel v. Lambert, 132
S. Ct. 1195 (2012); Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987 (2012); Hardy v. Cross, 132 S. Ct. 490
(2011); Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26 (2011); Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2 (2011). Again, no
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But here, willingness to engage in error correction was not a pre-
requisite for a vote for certiorari. Flouting of Supreme Court
precedent creates a pressing need for certiorari federal question.
Texas not only failed to apply Supreme Court precedent in this
case, but also had decided a stream of cases applying the clearly
impermissible Briseno factors to facilitate the execution of defend-
ants categorically protected by Atkins. The Court did not have to
take the word of Ramiro’s lawyers on this point: the amicus brief of
AAIDD and ARC, the premier organizations representing, respec-
tively, the professional experts on and familial representatives of,
the intellectually disabled, made that plain,216 and they had argued
the same in previous Texas Briseno factor cases.217
Why was it more important to grant certiorari on Florida’s sub-
average intellectual functioning deviation—which affected very few
cases—than on an adaptive functioning case, which affects far more
cases?218 Less than a month after Hall v. Florida condemned a depar-
ture from professional consensus in the application of the
intellectual functioning prong, the Fifth Circuit declared that Hall
had no effect on Texas’s gross deviations from professional consen-
sus concerning the adaptive functioning prong.219 Given the history
of resistance to Supreme Court precedent on intellectual disability
in capital cases, this stance should not have been a surprise.
Perhaps the Court has concluded that this explicit recalcitrance
requires admonishment. After this article was written—but before it
went to press—the Supreme Court did grant certiorari in a Texas
Briseno rule case, Moore v. Texas.220 Moore, however, has an idiosyn-
cratically phrased question presented: “Whether it violates the
Eighth Amendment . . . . to prohibit the use of current medical
standards on intellectual disability, and require the use of outdated
medical standards, in determining whether an individual may be
relief was granted to a criminal defendant or prisoner. See also, Merits Opinions, SCOTUS-
Blog (June 27, 2013), http://scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/merits-
opinions_OT12.pdf (charting summary reversals by Term).
216. See Brief of Am. Assoc. on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities & The Arc of
the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Hernandez v. Stephens, 537 F.
App’x. 531 (5th Cir. 2013).
217. See e.g., Brief of Am. Assoc. on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities & The Arc
of the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Lizcano v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 584
(2015).
218. Even outside of Texas, deviation on the second prong has been common. See gener-
ally, John H. Blume, Sheri L. Johnson & Christopher Seeds, An Empirical Look at Atkins v.
Virginia and its Application in Capital Cases, 76 TENN. L. REV. 625 (2009).
219. Mays v. Stephens, 757 F.3d 211, 219 (5th Cir. 2014).
220. 470 S.W.3d 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
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executed.”221 Why the Court chose this Texas case is unclear; one
can only hope that the Court will focus not on the narrow question
of current versus outdated medical standards, but turn its attention
to the gross deviations from clinic consensus employed in all Texas
determinations of the adaptive functioning prong. That question
was worthy of review in Ramiro’s case, and remains important to
resolve.
But gross deviation from the clinical definition adaptive function-
ing was not the only questions worthy of Supreme Court attention
in Hernandez v. Stephens. How is racial discrimination in the ad-
ministration of the death penalty not an important federal
question? The use of racial and ethnic criteria in Atkins cases is
neither subtle nor isolated.222 The amicus brief from Mexico and
from the Latino advocacy groups and law professors protested both
the intellectual functioning and the adaptive functioning determi-
nations as egregious race discrimination.223 If nothing else,
shouldn’t the Court’s attention to the broader implications of the
case have been drawn by the amicus brief from conservative legal
academics documenting and protesting the many other Atkins cases
in which race has played a role? Yet there was no dissent from de-
nial of certiorari from the purportedly colorblind wing of the
Court, nor was there dissent from Justice Sotomayor, who is often
far more willing to express her views on denials of certiorari.224
Because this is a Court purportedly committed to color blind-
ness, it should use its limited time to address the most outrageous
violations of that norm. Justice Stewart wrote in his concurrence in
McLaughlin v. Florida, more than fifty years ago, “[I]t is simply not
possible for a state law to be valid under our Constitution which
makes the criminality of an act depend upon the race of the actor.
221. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Moore v. Texas,  136 S.Ct. 2407 (2016) (No. 15-
797).
222. See generally Brief for Public Law Scholars, supra note 177.
223. See Brief of League for United Latin Am. Citizens et al., supra note 175.
224. See Yablon, supra note 215. Among the most prominent of her comments is her
statement respecting the denial of certiorari in Calhoun v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1136,
1138 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from a denial of cert.) where a federal prosecutor made ra-
cially charged remarks. Justice Sotomayor agreed that the consideration of the comment was
procedurally barred, but wrote to make plain that the vote to deny certiorari was procedur-
ally based and did not reflect her view on the impropriety of the remarks, which she then set
forth. Id. at 558–59. During her confirmation process, Justice Sotomayor was criticized for
saying “I would hope that a wise Latina woman, with the richness of her experience, would
more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male.” Confirmation Hearing on the
Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 139 (2009). I have no criticism
of that statement, but would have hoped for more of the “wise Latina” influence here.
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Discrimination of that kind is invidious per se.”225 Surely imposing
the death penalty on the basis of race, like assigning criminality
based upon race, is invidious per se. Surely the Supreme Court
should say so.
Finally, if there really is not sufficient time for the Supreme
Court to hear a case like this one, then, as both Justice Blackmun
and Justice Stevens concluded after years of such cases,226 abolition
of the death penalty is the only adequate reform.
IV. REQUIESCANT IN PACE?
A requiem mass, offered for the soul of one who has died, ends
in the Latin for “Rest in Peace.” After the expression of wrath in the
Dies Irae, there is a plea for mercy, and then, the assurance of
mercy.
If there is a merciful God, or mercy of any sort in the universe,
Ramiro rests in peace. His life was hell on earth, and to the extent
that his experiences and abilities allowed him to be remorseful, he
was. At the end, lying on the table with the poison flowing into his
veins, he said he was sorry, and that he loved his family.
As for Ramiro’s judges? May God have mercy on their souls.
225. 379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
226. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (“From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of
death.”); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 86 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I
have relied on my own experience in reaching the conclusion that the imposition of the
death penalty represents ‘the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal
contributions to any discernible social or public purposes.’”).
